Numerous studies indicate that civil society organizations create cultural change by deploying mainstream messages that resonate with prevailing discursive themes. Yet these case studies of highly influential organizations obscure the much larger population that have little or no impact. It is therefore unclear whether civil society organizations create cultural change by deploying mainstream discourses or if they become part of the mainstream because of their success. I present an evolutionary theory of how discursive fields settle after major historical ruptures that highlights framing, social networks, and emotional energy. To illustrate this theory, I use plagiarism detection software to compare 1,084 press releases about Muslims produced by 120 civil society organizations to 50,407 newspaper articles and television transcripts produced between 2001 and 2008. Although most organizations deployed pro-Muslim discourses after the September 11th attacks, I show that anti-Muslim fringe organizations dominated the mass media via displays of fear and anger. Institutional amplification of this emotional energy, I argue, created a gravitational pull or "fringe effect" that realigned inter-organizational networks and altered the contours of mainstream discourse itself.
Since the September 11th attacks, Islam has moved from the background to the foreground of the U.S. public sphere. Debates about the values, beliefs, and allegiances of Muslims have critical implications for domestic and foreign policy, civil liberties, intergroup cohesion, and national identity-to name but a few. Because of the high stakes involved, a diverse collection of civil society organizations has joined the struggle to define Islam over the past decade. These include Muslim advocacy organizations working to remove the violent stigma attached to their religion; interest groups and think tanks concerned about the treatment of women in Muslim societies; evangelical Christian organizations convinced Muslims are secretly plotting to overthrow the U.S. government; interfaith 465743A SRXXX10.1177/00031224124 65743American Sociological ReviewBail 2012 a University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and University of Michigan-Ann Arbor foundations that argue terrorism is practiced by people of all faiths; and even a social movement organization that aims to make it illegal to practice Islam in the United States. Together, these organizations are struggling to shift the symbolic boundaries Americans use to differentiate "us" from "them" (Douglas 1966; Lamont 2000; Wimmer 2008) .
The mass media is not the only forum where civil society organizations compete to create such cultural change, but it is arguably the most important (Ferree et al. 2002; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Jacobs and Townsley 2011; King 2011; Koopmans and Olzak 2004) . Numerous case studies suggest civil society organizations shape media discourse by deploying mainstream messages that resonate with prevailing cultural themes (e.g., Gamson and Modigliani 1989) . Yet these studies suffer from circular reasoning because they ignore the vast population of civil society organizations that fail to breach the public sphere: Does the mass media gravitate toward civil society organizations because they have mainstream discourses, or do organizations become mainstream precisely because the mass media cover them? As this question implies, inattention to negative cases is not simply a methodological faux pas. Rather, editorial decisions about which movements to cover may guide the evolution of mainstream discourse itself.
In this article, I present an evolutionary theory of how civil society organizations create cultural change following major historical ruptures such as the September 11th attacks. This approach locates the messages of individual civil society organizations within broader discursive fields to differentiate mainstream and "fringe" organizations both in and outside the public sphere (Snow 2004; Steinberg 1999; Wuthnow 1993) . Synthesizing theories of framing, social networks, and emotional energy, I argue that fringe organizations focus public attention on their peripheral claims via displays of fear or anger. Institutional amplification of this emotional energy not only makes fringe organizations visible but also creates a gravitational pull on the mainstream that restructures inter-organizational networks as well as the contours of discursive fields themselves. My theory of this "fringe effect" thus addresses longstanding questions about how discursive fields settle and opens new lines of inquiry about the ecological and evolutionary dynamics of collective behavior and cultural change within the public sphere.
To illustrate this theory, I present a novel mixed-method approach. I use plagiarism detection software to compare 1,084 press releases about Muslims produced by 120 civil society organizations to 50,407 newspaper articles and television transcripts from 2001 to 2008. This new technique measures not only whether but also how much civil society organizations create cultural change. To map the discursive field and identify displays of negative emotion, I use in-depth coding of each press release. Quantitative data from the Internal Revenue Service and Google describe each organization's financial and social resources and alternative indicators of media influence. I employ regression models to assess these indicators and introduce innovative field graphs that depict the evolution of discursive fields over time. I find that antiMuslim organizations captivated the mass media via displays of fear and anger after the September 11th attacks, even though the vast majority of civil society organizations deployed pro-Muslim messages. By 2008, these fringe organizations not only permeated the mainstream but also forged vast social networks that consolidated their capacity to create cultural change. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for field theory and the cultural consequences of collective behavior more broadly (e.g., Earl 2004; Isaac 2008; Polletta 2008) .
UnSETTlED TIMES, CIvIl SOCIETy OrgAnIzATIOnS, AnD DISCUrSIvE FIElDS
Cultural and political sociologists have long recognized the transformative potential of what Swidler (1986:282) calls "unsettled times." In contrast to settled times, characterized by consensus about how a society should function, unsettled times are the rare historical moments when large-scale crises or unprecedented events create bursts of cultural change (McAdam 1982; Sewell 1996; Wagner-Pacifici 2010; Wuthnow 1987) . Recent examples include the September 11th attacks, the Great Recession of 2008, and the Arab Spring. These historical turning points (Abbott 1997) share three common features. First, they create widespread public uncertainty and anxiety because few-if anypeople anticipated the unprecedented events (Kurzman 2004) . Second, this uncertainty threatens the legitimacy of dominant groups responsible for the reproduction of the social order. Finally, structural instability creates potent opportunities for new or rival factions to steer the course of cultural change. The importance of such opportunities for political change has been widely recognized (e.g., Amenta et al. 2010; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Soule and Olzak 2004) , but very little is known about how cultural change occurs during unsettled times-or how societies settle into a new status quo.
I argue that mass media is a key force in creating cultural change during unsettled times. Within this "master forum" (Ferree et al. 2002) , collective actors present competing diagnoses of crises and corresponding solutions to redress them. These media frames provide "a central organizing idea . . . for making sense of relevant events," and thereby "give meaning to an issue" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989:3) . The goal of such framing contests is not simply to attract media attention, but to influence the way journalists themselves interpret or classify social issues and "package [them] for efficient relay to their audiences" (Gitlin 1980:7) .
1 The September 11th attacks provoked a multitude of public debates on a variety of issues. In this article, I focus on the struggle to shape media discourse about Islam-specifically, how civil society actors influence media representations of the values, beliefs, and allegiances of Muslims vis-à-vis broader U.S. society, or the symbolic boundaries these groups use to shape public representations of "us" and "them" (Bail 2008; Lamont 2000; Wimmer 2008) .
The concept of media framing was born out of case studies of individual social movement organizations (e.g., Gitlin 1980 ). Yet a growing chorus of scholars call for greater attention to the broader organizational environment in which media framing contests occur (Best 2012; Evans 1997; Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McAdam 1996; McCammon 2012) . These environments include not only multiple social movement organizations but also advocacy organizations, think tanks, religious groups, interest groups, voluntary organizations, philanthropic foundations, and academic groups. As numerous scholars note, this organizational mosaic is typically obscured by disciplinary or subdisciplinary divides (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Brulle et al. 2007; Burstein and Linton 2002; Walker, McCarthy, and Baumgartner 2010) .
2 I argue that an ecological perspective on this diverse population reveals how cultural, structural, and emotional relationships between collective actors shape cultural change during unsettled times. Therefore, this article examines media framing contests among all civil society organizations-that is, nonstate and nonprofit organizations vying to influence media discourse about Islam following the September 11th attacks.
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The cornerstone of my theory is the concept of a discursive field (McCammon et al. 2007; Mohr 1998; Snow 2004; Steinberg 1999; Wuthnow 1993) . Discursive fields are the "dynamic terrain where meaning contests occur" (Spillman 1995:140) , which thereby define the "limits of discussion" on a particular issue (Wuthnow 1993:13) . Whereas other variants of field theory explain how broad social relationships pattern institutional logics or organizational routines (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Fligstein 2001) , discursive fields are the public battlegrounds where collective actors compete to give meaning to an issue. For my purposes, the concept serves two important functions. First, it allows me to map the range of media frames used by a population of civil society organizations competing to influence media discourse at a given point in time. 4 For example, one extreme of the discursive field described below is occupied by organizations that believe all Muslims are obligated to commit violence against nonbelievers. At the other extreme are those who believe Islam is inherently less violent than the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Second, the notion of a discursive field enables me to assess the distribution of media frames across civil society organizations to differentiate what I call "mainstream" and "fringe" organizations. I define mainstream organizations as those that regularly deploy one of the most common media frames within a discursive field at a given point in time. Conversely, fringe organizations are those that regularly deploy one of the least popular frames.
5 Whereas other studies use the term mainstream to refer to organizations that regularly receive media coverage or to describe powerful media outlets themselves, I use the term only to describe the representativeness of a civil society organization's media frame vis-à-vis the broader discursive field. This distinction is critical because it will enable me to determine whether civil society organizations influence the media by deploying mainstream media frames, or if they become part of the mainstream precisely because they receive media coverage.
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Carefully identifying the contours of mainstream discourse is also necessary because of the implicit ecological reasoning in many theories of culture and collective behavior. For example, classic studies in this field emphasize the power of cultural resonance (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Schudson 1989) . In this account, certain civil society organizations "have a natural advantage because their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes" (Gamson and Modigliani 1989:5) . Numerous recent studies also highlight the fit between an organization's framing strategy and its broader discursive environment (Evans 1997; McAdam 1996; Snow 2004; Williams 2004) . Together, these studies suggest mainstream organizations will dominate the media during unsettled times because of their central positions within discursive fields. More specifically, mainstream organizations may exert disproportionate influence on the media because their media frames are more easily integrated into broader media narratives because they appear familiar or legitimate.
Yet discursive fields also exhibit the principles of electromagnetism (Bourdieu 1984; Levi-Martin 2003; Wuthnow 1993) . The same social forces that bond civil society organizations together around a set of mainstream media frames within a discursive field propel others toward the fringe. Studies of media framing invoke ecological logic to explain cultural resonance, but they have not yet realized a set of complementary predictions that can be borrowed from the literature on organizational niches (e.g., Aldrich 1979; Freeman and Hannan 1983; Levitsky 2007) . Namely, media influence may be achieved not only through producing familiar, resonant messages but also through innovation (Lieberson 2000) . Novel media frames may be particularly compelling during unsettled times, as people search for new ways to understand unprecedented events (Sewell 1996; WagnerPacifici 2010) .
Media Frames, Social Networks, and Emotional Energy
This theoretical synthesis demonstrates the promise of an ecological perspective for understanding how discursive fields settle. Yet it is equally important to emphasize that "discourses . . . do not speak for themselves" (Ferree 2003:311) . Many previous studies assume framing contests occur in a vacuumdivorcing media frames from the collective actors that produce them and assuming that frames compete based on their own merit (Benford 1997; Steensland 2008 ). Yet a vast literature suggests the success of media frames depends on the resources of the collective actors that produce them. For example, wealthy organizations can afford to create dedicated infrastructure for media outreach or fund large-scale advertising campaigns (Andrews and Caren 2010; Bennett 2004; Corbett 1998; Vliegenthart, Oegema, and Klandermans 2005) . Similarly, civil society organizations with dense inter-organizational networks can easily mobilize large public protests or letter writing campaigns (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Diani and McAdam 2003; Lee 2002) . Financial and social resources not only increase organizations' visibility but also demonstrate their legitimacy before the media (Andrews and Caren 2010) .
One of the chief advantages of an ecological perspective of civil society organizations is that it enables analysis of the relationship between an organization's position within a discursive field and the competition for social and financial resources therein. As Bourdieu (1985) famously argued, discourses often become dominant within fields because of the uneven distribution of financial and social resources, or vice versa.
7 More recent studies have validated this argument in a range of empirical contexts (e.g., Armstrong 2002; Bearman 1993; Ghaziani and Baldassarri 2011; Lamont 1992; Mische 2008; Wimmer 2008) , although the direction of causality is not entirely clear. Regardless, these studies suggest mainstream organizations will consolidate social and financial resources because their popular narratives reflect the interests of vast constituencies. In contrast, fringe organizations' peripheral frames may not only lack broad appeal but may also reinforce the dominance of mainstream organizations. For example, Haines (1984) shows that public disdain for the Black Panther Party's peripheral message created a flank effect that facilitated fundraising by mainstream organizations in the Civil Rights Movement (e.g., the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People).
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If fringe organizations lack financial and social resources, how do they publicize their peripheral media frames? To answer this question, I argue that field theory must move beyond Bourdieu's emphasis on resources and interests toward the performative styles collective actors use to deliver their messages (Alexander 2006; Jacobs and Townsley 2011; Smith 2005) . Civil society organizations not only compete for resources within discursive fields but also for attention (DiMaggio 1997). As Collins (2001:27) argues, displays of emotional energy such as fear or anger play a key role in focusing public attention within such "attention spaces." A recent renaissance in the study of social movements suggests emotions play a key role in mobilization processes (Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Gould 2009; Summers-Effler 2010) , and I propose that displays of emotion also have key consequences for the cultural outcomes of collective behavior. This is because emotional bias is deeply embedded within most public institutions (Berezin 2002) , and the mass media in particular (Edelman 1964; Gitlin 1980; Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Lippmann 1922) . Moreover, studies indicate the emotional bias of collective attention is heightened after crises when public anxiety is rife (Altheide 2002; Collins 2012; Perrin 2005) .
A priori, these literatures suggest displays of emotion should benefit both fringe and mainstream civil society organizations competing to influence the mass media during unsettled times. Yet an ecological perspective of the distribution of emotional energy across discursive fields reveals that displays of negative emotions carry considerable risk for mainstream civil society organizations. As Jasper (2006:127) argues, mainstream organizations face an "extension dilemma." The larger they grow in size, the more diverse their constituencies become. This internal diversity limits the strategies organizations can draw on, because certain tactics-such as displays of emotion-may please some members or allies but estrange others. Such risks are particularly unnecessary if mainstream organizations already have the resources to publicize their messages through conventional channels. Fringe organizations, on the other hand, have little to lose. Indeed, fringe organizations may become emotional precisely because they are unable to mobilize broad constituencies or attract public attention in the first place.
9 Or, fringe organizations may display negative emotions strategically to exploit the media's emotional bias.
To review, I argue that an ecological perspective not only illuminates the discursive environments civil society organizations inhabit during unsettled times, but also explains how their positions within this discursive field are related to the distribution of resources and emotional energy across organizations. This theoretical synthesis yields three predictions. First, mainstream civil society organizations create cultural change during unsettled times because their messages resonate with prevailing discursive themes and because they possess the social and financial resources necessary to publicize them. Second, fringe organizations create cultural change by occupying niches within discursive fields. Due to lack of resources, fringe organizations depend on displays of negative emotion-intentional or not-to focus public attention on their peripheral media frames. My theory thus responds to recent calls to integrate cultural, structural, and emotional theories of collective behavior (e.g., Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Polletta 1997; Viterna 2012) by explaining how different configurations of these factors enable civil society organizations to create cultural change.
The Evolution of Discursive Fields
A third and final prediction concerns change over time. To this point, I have described discursive fields as if they are static. Yet numerous studies document the evolutionary dynamics of the public sphere (e.g., Hilgartner and Bosk 1988; Kennedy 2008; Koopmans 2004; Oliver and Myers 2002) . Because of the mass media's limited carrying capacity, selection processes create an inevitable distortion of discursive fields. In this way, the mass media is not a democratic forum but a prism that communicates the contours of discursive fields to the public and the civil society organizations that inhabit it. This distortion may have two consequences for the evolution of discursive fields. First, disproportionate media coverage of mainstream organizations during unsettled times may reinforce their resonance by amplifying their already popular media frames even further across the public sphere. Yet if fringe organizations receive a significant amount of media coverage, these same evolutionary dynamics may alter the contours of mainstream discourse itself. Not unlike White's (1981) description of the emergence of financial markets, this fringe effect may provoke other organizations within the field to alter their framing strategies or inspire still others to enter or exit the discursive field entirely.
rESEArCh DESIgn
Evaluating these three predictions about how civil society organizations influence media discourse during unsettled times presents several methodological challenges. Most studies of media framing rely heavily on newspaper data, even though it is well known that the majority of civil society organizations fail to reach the media (Koopmans 2004; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Snyder and Kelley 1977) . This selection on the dependent variable has left the literature "plagued by circular claims in which unverifiable causal relationships are implied" (Benford 1997:412) . Several studies address this issue by collecting independent samples of civil society organizations and counting the number of times they are mentioned in newspapers (Amenta et al. 2009; Andrews and Caren 2010; Oliver and Maney 2000) . Yet studies note media coverage can be cursory or in-depth (Smith et al. 2001 ) and positive or negative (Gitlin 1980; Sobieraj 2011) .
To measure both whether and how much civil society organizations create cultural change, I used plagiarism detection software. More specifically, I used this innovative technique to compare a large sample of press releases about Muslims produced by civil society organizations to an even larger sample of newspaper articles and television transcripts produced between 2001 and 2008. Alongside disruptive tactics such as protests and strikes, press releases are one of the primary tools civil society organizations use to influence the media (Benford 1993; Klandermans and Gosingla 1996; Koopmans 2004; Sobieraj 2011 ). According to Bennett (2004) , more than half of national news content is derived from press releases or press conferences-and many press releases are verbatim transcripts of press conferences. Most press releases include a target (e.g., the government or a rival organization), a description of an event, and commentary from a civil society organization's leaders. Below, I explain how I used press releases to map the contours of the discursive field of civil society organizations that vied to shape media discourse about Islam after the September 11th attacks.
As with any ecological analysis, defining the boundaries of a discursive field is critical. Brulle and colleagues (2007) show that a multipronged sampling approach minimizes the risk of sampling error in the study of organizational populations. I thus employed three sources to survey the total population of press releases produced by all U.S. civil society organizations vying to influence media discourse about Islam. First, I searched a Lexis-Nexis archive of press releases distributed by seven of the largest U.S. public relations firms for all documents that mentioned the terms "Muslim" or "Islam" or a related set of terms in the seven-year period following September 10, 2001.
11 From this source, I obtained 815 press releases from 96 civil society organizations after excluding irrelevant documents.
12
Because many civil society organizations cannot afford to distribute press releases through media firms, I collected a parallel sample of press releases and organizations using two large databases of nonprofit organizations employed by many previous studies: Guidestar and the Encyclopedia of Associations. 13 The former lists all organizations that file for nonprofit 501(c)(3) status from the U.S. government. The latter includes many of the same organizations but adds more comprehensive coverage of regional and local organizations as well as those that have not yet filed for nonprofit status (Andrews, Hunter, and Edwards 2012) . I queried these databases to identify civil society organizations working to shape public discourse about Islam using the same search criteria described above. I then visited the websites of each of the organizations identified through this search and downloaded their press releases.
14 The total sample includes 1,084 press releases produced by 120 civil society organizations. 15 Next, I collected media coverage of these 120 civil society organizations from six national media sources. Previous studies of collective behavior and the media have been criticized for relying too heavily on the New York Times, which has a well-documented liberal bias Ortiz et al. 2005) . Therefore, my analysis also includes the centrist USA Today and the conservative Washington Times. 16 Because television news continues to supplant print media as the most powerful institution within the public sphere (Iyengar and Kinder 1988) , I also include transcripts from three major television news networks: CBS News (liberal), CNN (centrist), and Fox News (conservative). In total, I collected 50,407 documents from these six sources produced between 2001 and 2008. 17 Together, these newspaper and television sources provide a well-balanced sample of national media coverage of the field of civil society organizations vying to shape public discourse about Islam.
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To compare each press release to the media coverage of each organization, I used plagiarism detection software developed by Bloomfield (2011) . 19 This software identifies exact and near matches of text between two sets of documents as follows. First, all unique words in each document are replaced with a root word using a thesaurus text file. For example, the word "outstanding" is replaced with the term "excellent." Next, the entire text of both sets of documents is parsed into six-word strings. The software then identifies all cases where four of the six words in a string match.
These matches are highlighted in HTML files with hyperlinks that enable a human coder to compare the two documents side-by-side. I inspected each match individually to verify that it described positive influence of the civil society organization that sponsored the press release being analyzed. 20 As Table 1 shows, media influence is relatively rare. The mean number of matched or paraphrased words per press release is less than five, and 85 percent of civil society organizations in my sample had no media influence at all.
Identifying Mainstream and Fringe Media Frames in Press Releases
To identify the contours of the discursive field and differentiate mainstream and fringe civil society organizations, I used a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses of the press releases in my sample. I began by mapping the range of media frames produced by the civil society organizations across all press releases. After three rounds of coding on random samples of press releases with a research Closeness centrality of organization within field (constructed using interlocking directorates by year).
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assistant, I identified five media frames. 21 The Muslims as victims frame suggests Muslims should not be blamed for the politically motivated violence of groups inspired by apocryphal interpretations of their religion. Conversely, the Muslims as enemies frame depicts all Muslims as potentially violent radicals who have a religious obligation to overthrow Western governments. The battle for the hearts and minds frame draws a middle path between these two extremes, suggesting moderate Muslims must be enlisted to root out the extremists among them. The blurring frame suggests Muslims should not be judged based on their religion, but on other components of their identity that overlap with non-Muslims such as citizenship or language. Finally, the Muslim empowerment frame suggests that Islam is not only inherently opposed to violence, but that it provides more sophisticated theological tenets for the prevention of ethnic violence than do other religions. I describe each of these media frames in greater detail in the online supplement.
Distinguishing mainstream and fringe civil society organizations requires analysis of the distribution of these five media frames across the entire discursive field. Frequency counts of each media frame cannot be used for two reasons. First, many press releases contain multiple media frames. 22 Second, my theoretical framework suggests the distribution of media frames may shift over time such that organizations that are in the mainstream during one period may drift toward the fringe of discursive fields over time, or vice versa. To account for the multidimensionality and dynamism of discursive fields, I measured the Euclidean distance from the dummy variables used to describe the media frames in each press release to the average values of these indicators across all organizations during the year in which the press release was distributed. 23 Small Euclidean distance scores represent press releases that deploy mainstream media frames and large scores represent fringe media frames. For example, in a hypothetical year when most press releases deployed one of the first three frames described earlier, releases that used the latter two would have large Euclidean distance scores that reflect the rarity of these discourses at that point in time.
Financial and Social Resources
To measure each civil society organization's financial and social resources, I used three indicators derived from Internal Revenue Service data in the Guidestar Database.
24 I used the log of each organization's total assets at year end to measure its financial resources. To measure each organization's social resources, I constructed a network measure of interlocking board members between them (Mizruchi 1996) . First, I created a relational database of every board member affiliated with each organization by year. I then used this dataset to calculate the closeness centrality of each organization within the broader discursive field by year. 25 As Gamson (1990) recognized, however, well-endowed or wellnetworked civil society organizations may not dedicate all of their resources toward a single cause. Therefore, using each organization's mission statement described on IRS form 990, I created a dummy variable that describes whether an organization's principal goal was to shape media discourse about Islam.
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Displays of Fear and Anger
I conducted qualitative coding of each press release to identify displays of fear or anger. Although a number of recent studies of emotions and collective behavior rely on such textual data, no formal measurement approach exists at present in the literature. 27 Linguists measure emotional language using quantitative methods that identify patterns of language around keywords such as "hate" or "love" (e.g., Bao et al. 2011 ). Yet this approach ignores the context of such language, which is needed to identify displays of emotion.
28 To capture such context, I developed a preliminary coding scheme to identify displays of fear or anger through inductive qualitative coding of each press release. Unfortunately, this improved approach still obscures the bodily manifestation of emotions. Fortunately, many press releases in my sample are verbatim transcripts of press conferences available in video format online. I used this visual evidence to triangulate my coding scheme. This revised coding scheme was then applied to the full sample. I then created a dummy variable that describes displays of fear or anger in each press release.
Alternative Explanatory Measures
Finally, I added controls for six additional variables that previous studies have associated with media coverage. First, I included a measure of the news cycle of issues surrounding Muslims, because previous studies suggest media coverage is highly cumulative (Andrews and Caren 2010; McCarthy et al. 1996; Oliver and Maney 2000) . I derived this measure from the number of times the terms "Muslim" or "Islam" were mentioned in major U.S. media outlets for each week between 2001 and 2008 in the Google News Archive. Second, studies indicate that media coverage of an organization greatly improves an organization's chances of future coverage (Gans 1979; Seguin 2012) . Therefore, I included a dummy variable that describes whether the organization sponsoring the press release previously influenced media discourse about Islam according to my plagiarism detection measure. Studies also suggest that journalists are more likely to cover an event if it involves government actors (Amenta et al. 2009; Oliver and Maney 2000; Rohlinger 2006; Smith et al. 2001) . I thus created a dummy variable that describes whether the U.S. government was the target of the press release.
In addition, I developed several measures that describe characteristics of the events described in the press releases themselves. For example, studies indicate that journalists tend to cover issues they believe will be of interest to broad audiences (Clayman and Reisner 1998) . I therefore created a dummy variable that is positive if any events described in the press release were among the top-10 Google searches during the week it was released. 29 Studies also indicate that collective violence or disruptive activity attract media attention (Amenta et al. 2009; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Oliver and Myers 1999) . I thus created a dummy variable that describes whether the press release describes physical violence, strikes, protests, rallies, or boycotts. It is also well known that geographic proximity of an event is a core news value (Galtung and Ruge 1965; Koopmans and Vliegenthart 2011) . I created a dummy variable that is positive if the event described in the press release occurred in the United States.
rESUlTS
To identify how the indicators described earlier are associated with media influence of civil society organizations, I employ a crosssectional negative binomial regression model. This technique accounts for the significant overdispersion of the outcome variable, and has been used by previous studies of collective behavior and the media for the same reason (Amenta et al. 2009; Andrews and Caren 2010; Koopmans and Vliegenthart 2011; McVeigh, Neblett, and Shafiq 2006) . Because individual press release observations within the model are clustered across organizations, I employ standard errors that are robust to intra-organizational correlation (Deb, Manning, and Norton 2012; Gelman and Hill 2007; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008) . The model does not include yearly dummy variables because they are highly correlated with my measure of the news cycle about Islam. 30 Instead, I first present the timeinvariant model that uses press releases as the unit of analysis and then examine change over time using descriptive measures calculated at the organizational level of analysis. Model 1 includes the following core indicators: position within the discursive field, organizational assets, inter-organizational networks, narrowness of organizational mission vis-à-vis shaping public discourse about Islam, and displays of fear or anger. Recall that I calculated the measure of position within the discursive field using the Euclidean distance of the discursive variables in each press release from the average of all organizations during the time period in question. Therefore, the greater the Euclidean distance, the more the media frames used in the press releases occupy the fringe of the discursive field. As Table 2 shows, this measure of fringe media frames has a positive and highly significant association with media influence in Model 1. Displays of fear or anger also have a positive and highly significant association with media influence. Model 1 also suggests that financial and social resources help civil society organizations achieve media influence. Inter-organizational networks, financial assets, and narrowness of organizational mission have positive and significant associations with media influence. Model 2 presents the six alternative explanatory measures. Four of these measures have a significant relationship with media influence. Previous media coverage is the strongest predictor of the dummy variables in the model. This suggests that previous coverage may help organizations to be perceived as legitimate or to build relationships with individual media outlets as reliable sources. Yet some of this effect may also be the product of omitted variable bias resulting from exclusion of indicators employed in the first model. Press releases that target the U.S. government are more likely to achieve media influence, as are releases that describe an event that occurred within the United States. Finally, civil society organizations that time their press releases within the news cycle about Muslims have an advantage above those that do not. Each of these findings confirms expectations about media influence from previous studies of collective behavior and the media. Press releases that describe violent or disruptive events have a very small positive effect, yet it is almost half the size of the standard error. Press releases that describe high profile events of public interest also have a small positive yet insignificant association with media influence. This may suggest that the media searches for stories from civil society organizations during the regular news cycle but shifts to creating its own narratives after major newsworthy events.
Model 3 combines the first two models to determine whether the core findings from Model 1 are robust to the alternative explanatory measures presented in Model 2. In this full model, displays of fear or anger continue to have a positive and significant association with media influence. Put in real terms using incidence rate ratios, press releases that display negative emotions increase the number of words matched by a factor of 3.16, holding other variables constant in the model. The relationship between fringe media frames and media influence is also very strong. A one standard deviation increase in the Euclidean distance measure results in 2.96 times the number of words matched between press releases and newspaper articles or television transcripts. Inter-organizational networks also continue to predict media influence. Ceteris paribus, each network tie multiplies the number of words matched by 1.92. Yet in the full model, positive effects of organizational assets and narrowness of mission identified in Model 1 are no longer significant.
Turning to the alternative explanatory measures in Model 3, all but one has a positive and significant association with media influence (in the expected directions). The measure of previous media coverage continues to have a positive and significant correlation with media influence, signaling the need to further analyze effects of the other variables over time. The model also reveals modest significant effects for the news cycle, press releases that describe high profile events, events that occur within the United States, and events that target the U.S. government. Interestingly, the indicator of violent or disruptive activity is negative and insignificant in the full model. Previous studies report positive effects for this variable on media coverage (e.g., Amenta et al. 2009 ), but this result indicates such tactics do not translate into media influence.
31 This finding resonates with previous studies that suggest journalists and other public figures often denigrate organizations that resort to violent or disruptive tactics (Gitlin 1980; Rojas 2006; Sobieraj 2011) .
As an additional robustness check, Model 4 adds interaction terms between fringe media frames and two of the alternative explanatory measures. The first term combines fringe media frames with the measure of the news cycle, to investigate the possibility that fringe organizations are merely opportunistic actors who rely on external events to influence media representations of Islam. Model 4 also adds an interaction term between fringe media frames and violent or disruptive activity to assess whether peripheral organizations that rely on unconventional tactics get attention. Neither of these interaction terms is significant.
Finally, Model 4 includes two interaction terms designed to assess the first two predictions of the theoretical model: fringe civil society organizations should benefit from displays of negative emotion and mainstream civil society organizations should benefit from social resources. To evaluate these predictions, I included interaction terms between fringe media frames and displays of fear or anger, and fringe media frames and interorganizational networks. The first interaction term has a highly significant positive association with media influence. This finding provides strong support for the first prediction in the theoretical framework: displays of fear or anger benefit fringe organizations more than mainstream organizations. Yet displays of negative emotions may also be of some benefit to mainstream organizations because the main effect of this variable remains positive and significant in this model. The second interaction term also has a significant negative correlation with media influence that supports my second hypothesis that mainstream organizations benefit from social resources more than fringe organizations. Effects of these interactions are consistent even when they are included individually in separate models.
Tracing the Evolution of Discursive Fields
These interaction terms are instructive, but my theoretical framework suggests fringe media frames, inter-organizational networks, and displays of negative emotions may have varied effects across time. Three-way interactions with dummy variables for discrete time periods could be included in the model, but they have several disadvantages. First, they fail to capture how time alters the form of indicators in the model (Isaac and Griffin 1989) . This is important given that the third and final prediction in my model suggests media coverage has evolutionary consequences that will either broaden the number of mainstream organizations or enable fringe organizations to redefine the mainstream. Second, three-way interaction terms fail to capture changing relationships between the organizations themselves, such as the growth of new network ties between organizations or an organization's movement from one part of the discursive field to another. Finally, there is little evidence that cultural change occurs within discrete time periods. To the contrary, numerous studies reveal that public discourse changes in fits-often in response to exogenous events (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Sewell 1996) . In short, evaluating the final prediction in my theoretical framework requires a methodology that is fundamentally processoriented (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005; Hedström and Bearman 2011; Padgett and Powell 2012; Thelen 2004; Wimmer 2008) .
To develop such a model, I began by identifying a group of events likely to create abrupt changes within the discursive field. Using the aforementioned data on the top-10 Google searches each week, I identified three time periods defined by six events that involved high-profile discussions about Islam. The first period (2001 to To illustrate the changing relationships between fringe media frames, displays of negative emotions, inter-organizational networks, and media influence across these three periods, I introduce what I call "field graphs" (see Figure press releases, the lighter shade represents those that do so between one and two thirds of their press releases, and the white circles are organizations that do so in less than one third of their press releases. This panoramic view of the discursive field also reveals precisely which media frames constitute mainstream and fringe discourse during each period. For example, the first field graph shows that civil society organizations deploying the Muslims as enemies frame occupied the fringe of the discursive field between 2001 and 2003. Of the 50 organizations in the field at this time, only 10 deployed this frame. Remarkably, however, Figure 1 shows these fringe organizations were among the most influential in the field during the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. If one ignores the small circles in the graph that describe organizations with no media influence, one finds that five of the ten most influential civil society organizations during this period deployed the Muslims as enemies frame. Thus, a study that ignores the large population of organizations that fail to breach the public sphere would mistake these fringe organizations for part of the mainstream; they are among the largest groups represented in the media but not in the broader discursive field.
Even more remarkably, Figure 1 reveals that the number of organizations deploying the Muslims as enemies frame nearly doubled between the first and second period analyzed-gradually breaking into the mainstream. As in the first period, the second field graph suggests these organizations influenced media because they regularly displayed fear or anger. Indeed, all of the 16 organizations that deployed this antiMuslim frame frequently displayed emotions, as evidenced by the circles' darker shade in this region of the field. Interestingly, the second field graph also shows that these organizations began to broaden their social networks during this period. Organizations deploying the Muslims as enemies frame shared only two board members in the first period; by the second period, they not only had multiple network ties with each other, but they also had numerous ties to influential mainstream organizations (pictured in the left center of the second field graph).
The final field graph for 2007 to 2008 suggests organizations deploying the Muslims as enemies frame expanded their networks even further between the second and third periods. Moreover, the proportion of organizations deploying this frame continued to increase dramatically. Whereas anti-Muslim organizations represented one fifth of all organizations in the discursive field during the first period, they represented nearly two fifths of the field by the final period. In other words, my analysis suggests that civil society organizations that deployed the Muslims as enemies frame drifted from the fringe of the discursive field to the very center of the mainstream over time. While they were scarcely connected to other organizations during the first periods, anti-Muslim fringe organizations also continued to reap the benefits of social networks as they entered the mainstream. More than half of the organizations with network ties to other organizations in the field during this period deployed the Muslims as enemies frame.
DISCUSSIOn AnD COnClUSIOnS
To review, this study asked how civil society organizations create cultural change during the unsettled times that follow major historical ruptures. To overcome the circular reasoning of previous studies, I presented an evolutionary framework that locates the messages of individual organizations within broader discursive fields. This ecological perspective, I suggested, illuminates not only the cultural but also the structural and emotional relationships between civil society organizations that determine whether and how civil society organizations breach the public sphere. Previous studies argue that journalists gravitate toward resonant mainstream organizations with the resources necessary to publicize their messages, but I found that angry and fearful fringe organizations not only exerted powerful influence on media discourse about Muslims in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, but ultimately became some of the most influential mainstream groups in the field. Throughout this process, fringe organizations developed broad inter-organizational networks that further consolidated their capacity to influence the media and challenge the contours of the mainstream. I call this the "fringe effect."
How did anti-Muslim organizations drift from the fringe of the discursive field into the mainstream? The evolutionary component of my theoretical framework suggests institutions such as the media contribute to the fringe effect within discursive fields during unsettled times. As Figure 1 shows, fringe organizations were heavily overrepresented in the media after the September 11th attacks and mainstream organizations were significantly underrepresented. Because the vast majority of people rely on the media to understand the contours of a discursive field, anti-Muslim fringe organizations were most likely perceived as part of the mainstream. This increased standing may have enabled fringe organizations to identify each other and consolidate their resources, or identify new partners from outside their corner of the discursive field. Through these expanding social networks and the inertia of the media echo chamber, my findings suggest institutional amplification of fringe organizations profoundly shaped the contours of the discursive field.
Before concluding that the evolutionary dynamics of the public sphere vaulted antiMuslim fringe organizations into the mainstream, it will be useful to evaluate several alternative explanations. Until now, I have assumed that civil society organizations and the mass media are the only actors capable of shaping discursive fields. Yet it is well known that the state exerts enormous influence on discursive fields in the wake of crises (Fligstein and McAdam 2012) . Not only does the mass media provide a sounding board for the state during such moments, but government statements usually provoke responses from civil society organizations as well. To identify how states shape discursive fields, I analyzed an additional 257 press releases produced by 30 state organizations that were originally excluded from the sample above.
34 After coding media frames in each of these documents I recalibrated my Euclidean-distance measure of fringe media frames. The results are nearly identical. In the full model, the coefficient for fringe media frames drops from 1.087 to .950 but remains highly significant.
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A second objection to my interpretation of the results is that discursive fields may be shaped not only by the collective actors who inhabit them and the media that describe them, but also by the broader public that consumes media messages (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; Snow 2004 ). Journalists may be influenced by their audiences' views, and these audiences may also provide civil society organizations with the resources necessary to publicize their frames. Although public opinion data do not capture nuances of the frames described earlier, a crude analysis can be conducted via six crosssectional surveys of American attitudes toward Muslims conducted by the Pew Foundation between 2000 and 2007. These data reveal only 4.9 percent of Americans held "very unfavorable" views of Muslim Americans in November 2001.
36 Yet these numbers increased steadily each year before reaching 9.7 percent of all Americans in 2007. Thus there is little evidence that public opinion enabled the rise of antiMuslim fringe organizations. To the contrary, it is possible that media amplification of fringe organizations contributed to this rise in negative public opinion of Islam.
A third objection is that the increase in negative public opinion toward Muslims and the dramatic growth of anti-Muslim organizations was simply a response to exogenous developments outside the discursive field, such as terrorist attacks or collective violence by Muslims. Since the September 11th attacks, however, numerous studies have revealed a marked decrease in terrorism by self-described Muslims (e.g., Altheide 2006; Kurzman 2011; Tilly 2004 ). According to Kurzman, such terrorists accounted for less than .0002 percent of murders in the United States since the September 11th attacks and .0003 percent of deaths each day worldwide. Other studies argue that terrorism has decreased precisely because the September 11th attacks galvanized Muslims against extremist groups such as Al Qaeda (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009 ). In the United States alone, for example, the Muslim American community is credited with foiling several terrorist plots (Schanzer, Kurzman, and Moosa 2010) . These findings indicate that exogenous events do not account for the rise of fringe organizations in and of themselves. Instead, the rise of anti-Muslim organizations may contribute to continued media coverage of these relatively rare events.
Yet another alternative explanation of the dramatic increase in anti-Muslim organizations is that there was a lag effect in the creation of anti-Muslim organizations following the September 11th attacks. That is, anti-Muslim organizations may have formed immediately thereafter but did not develop the organizational infrastructure to produce press releases or register with the Internal Revenue Service until years later. To evaluate this possibility, I used the Guidestar database and the Encyclopedia of Associations to identify the year each civil society organization was founded. Of the 41 civil society organizations that deployed the Muslims as enemies frame between 2001 and 2008, only nine were founded after 2001. Moreover, 18 of the 41 organizations deployed other media frames before joining the chorus of anti-Muslim organizations. This finding mirrors White's (1981) argument about how the success of one business creates incentives for mimicry that ultimately structure markets. Yet further studies are needed to determine whether and precisely how civil society organizations modify framing strategies to resonate with the changing contours of mainstream discourse over time.
For now, my analysis has several important implications for the study of discursive fields, collective behavior, and institutions during unsettled times. First, I identified new interactions between cultural, structural, and emotional processes. Whereas Mische (2008) found that entrepreneurial political organizations can broker partisan network divides by deploying novel discourses, and Wimmer (2008) showed that networks can bridge cultural or ethnic divides, my study identifies how emotional energy enables and constrains such processes. In particular, my findings indicate that public displays of fear or anger enable civil society organizations without resources or resonant messages to achieve resonance. This heightened visibility not only facilitates fringe organizations' accumulation of resources, but it also creates a profound dilemma for mainstream organizations. If mainstream organizations react angrily to the rise of fringe organizations, they may only increase the profile of these once marginal actors. Yet if they do not respond, mainstream organizations risk being ignored.
37 Future studies are needed to determine how such exchanges of emotional energy-or lack thereof-contribute to the crescive momentum of fringe discourse, or the realignment of structural networks such as the widespread defection of mainstream organizations toward the fringe identified above.
Second, this study addresses cutting-edge questions about how social fields evolve (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Padgett and Powell 2012) . Not unlike framing theory, field theory is often castigated for being tautological. That is, field theorists often make a set of assumptions about how social fields reproduce inequality without ever observing the contours of the field itself. My analysis indicates that public institutions such as the media play a key role in these processes by communicating the contours of the field back to the actors who inhabit it. These selective portraits of the playing field change the very nature of the game. The media's emotional distortion may attenuate the polarity of discursive fields (Wuthnow 1993) ; shape movement-countermovement dynamics (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010) ; or influence the dialogical progress of discursive fields writ large (Steinberg 1999) . In brief, media selection processes ensure that within discursive fields, "the ground is [always] in motion" (Emery and Trist 1965:26) . Or, in Isaac's (2008) terms, the media facilitates the movement of social movements as they redefine cultural forms in the wake of crises. Combined with my discussion of emotional energy, these findings about the evolutionary consequences of media coverage call for a critical reappraisal of the role of attention, performance, and visibility within social fields.
Finally, this study has important implications for the study of collective behavior outside the media. Civil society organizations are not the only actors who rely on the media to understand the contours of discursive fields. As Koopmans (2004:367) argues, policy makers usually only "react to [civil society organization's] activities if and as they are depicted in the mass media" [emphasis added]. Therefore, media coverage may also enable fringe organizations to accomplish their political agendas. Similarly, media coverage may help fringe organizations shape public opinion. As Anderson (1993) argues, media enables us to imagine ourselves as part of vast communities-the entirety of which we can never meet in person. The media are particularly instrumental in the present case because of the immense geographic and linguistic divides that separate most Muslims and non-Muslims. These chasms are particularly deep in the United States, where a majority of people have never met a Muslim-even though Islam is among the fastest growing religions in the country (Read 2007) . Although media effects are not always direct (Cerulo 1998; Press and Cole 2001) , the emotional resonance of fringe organizations may have a particularly powerful effect on public opinion because of the emotional bias of individual and collective memory (Schacter 2001) .
A final issue concerns the generalizability of my theory beyond the study of media discourse about Islam following the September 11th attacks. Future studies are needed to determine whether the fringe effect occurs within other discursive fields transitioning out of unsettled times. My research design cannot address such questions, but a cursory application of my theory to explain how the Tea Party shaped public discourse about the economy after the Great Recession of 2008 yields several intriguing parallels. First, a recent content analysis of Tea Party discourse suggests its core message about government debt was at the fringe of public discourse about the economy until recently (Parker and Barreto 2012) . Second, displays of negative emotions were such a prominent component of the Tea Party's first two years that two recent monographs about the movement are titled Mad as Hell and Boiling Mad. Finally, it appears that media amplification of these emotional messages has created a gravitational pull on mainstream conservatives that has profoundly altered the trajectory of public discourse about the economy (Perrin et al. 2011; Skocpol and Williamson 2012) . These initial observations suggest fringe effects might be observed in a variety of discursive fields amidst unsettled times and signal the need for further studies of the evolutionary dynamics of collective behavior and cultural change within the public sphere.
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drafts. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, and the Eastern Sociological Society and the Departments of Sociology at Princeton University, the University of California-Los Angeles, the University of Michigan, Vanderbilt University, Stanford University, Duke University, the University of North Carolina, Emory University, the University of Georgia, the City University of New York, the University of British Columbia, Boston College, the University of Manchester, and Harvard University. notes 1. Media frames are thus distinct from collective action frames that are used to mobilize people to join or support social movement organizations or other civil society organizations (Benford and Snow 2003) . 2. But see Ferree and colleagues (2002) . 3. Civil society organizations constitute a critical subset of all collective actors vying for media influence during unsettled times, but states also exert powerful influence on public discourse because of their unique capacity to provide an official version of events. In the Discussion and Conclusions section, I discuss how this official discourse contributes to cultural change during unsettled times. 4. I use the terms "media influence" and "influence on the media" interchangeably to describe the impact of civil society organizations on media discourse about Islam. 5. Fringe organizations are distinct from radical organizations in two ways. First, fringe organizations are defined only by the representativeness of their media framing strategy, and not by their normative position vis-à-vis powerful or hegemonic actors in the field. Second, radical organizations typically view the media as an enemy or tool of their opponents (Ferree 2003; Katzenstein 1999; Staggenborg 1994; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004) , whereas fringe organizations aim to achieve media influence despite their uncommon messages. 6. For example, a study that examines only the range of media frames among civil society organizations that have already breached the public sphere may confuse mainstream and fringe organizations, or vice versa. 7. Several recent studies demonstrate the interpenetration of discourse and structure within fields of civil society organizations. For example, Armstrong (2002) shows that creation of a "coming out" frame led to crystallization of powerful lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) advocacy organizations in the 1970s. Similarly, Ghaziani and Baldassari (2011) introduce the concept of "cultural anchors" to explain the interpenetration of discourses and social networks within the LGBT movement. Conversely, Bartley (2007) argues that the financial resources provided by philanthropic foundations shaped the framing strategies developed by environmental movements by providing the financial and organizational infrastructure to bring disparate organizations together around a shared cause. For a more detailed review, see Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) . 8. See also Jasper (2006) and Rohlinger (2006) . 9. Both Gould (2009) and Summers-Effler (2002) suggest that emotional arousal within social movement organizations may result from repeated failures to mobilize resources or attract public attention. 10. See also Kennedy (2008) and Powell and colleagues (2005) . 11. Media distribution firms included PR Newswire, Targeted Newswire, U.S. Newswire, Ascribe Newswire, Christian Newswire, U.S. Fed News, and U.S. State News. Together, these press release distributors represent more than two thirds of the market in press release distribution according to multiple experts consulted in the field. 12. I excluded press releases for one of the following reasons: (1) the organization did not meet the definition of a civil society organization described earlier (e.g., state agencies and private corporations); (2) Muslims were not the substantive focus of the press release-for example, many press releases were produced by corporations advertising a new product or service in a Muslim majority country; (3) the press release was explicitly directed toward journalists outside the United States; or (4) the organization sponsoring the press release did not produce more than one document about Islam during the seven-year period analyzed. 13. For example, see Brulle and colleagues (2007) , Minkoff, Aisenbrey, and Agnone (2008) , and . 14. Because many organizations only post recent press releases on their websites, I used the Internet Archive to collect older press releases. The Internet Archive catalogues nearly every website on the web each month so that users can visit the website exactly as it appeared at a previous point in time. 15. These organizations' names are listed in the online supplement (http://asr.sagepub.com/supplemental). 16. The ideological biases of media sources were assessed using Groseclose and Milyo's (2005) Grimmer (2010) . 20. Individual inspection was also necessary to eliminate matches in which (1) media coverage was either dismissive or critical of text from a press release produced by a civil society organization; (2) matches were based on irrelevant material such as bylines, subject indices, or contact information from press releases; or (3) matches were based on statements made by people outside the civil society organization that sponsored the press release. For example, many press releases contained statements from enemies or targets of the civil society organization that sponsored the release. I only counted matches based on utterances of the civil society organizations that sponsored the press release in question. 21. The procedures used to code the documents are described in detail in the online supplement. Intercoder reliability for all variables created via in-depth qualitative coding exceeded appropriate levels of Cohen's Kappa (see Table S2 in the online supplement). 22. For example, numerous press releases argue that Muslims should not suffer discrimination (Muslims as victims frame) because they are U.S. citizens (blurring frame).
The Euclidean distance (d) is given by:
Where p is the set of dummy variables for each of the five media frames for press release i, and q is the average set of scores for the same indicators across all civil society organizations during the same year. Baldassari and Bearman (2007) used a similar approach to measure political polarization in a formal simulation model. Use of alternative measures such as Jaccard or Mahalanobis distances did not produce substantively different results. 24. Of the organizations in my sample, 10 percent did not file IRS form 990 because they did not have or want 501(c)(3) status, or because they received a religious exemption. I contacted these organizations directly by phone and e-mail to obtain data. For organizations that did not respond, I extracted data from their website. A small number of organizations filed IRS form 990 for some but not all years. I imputed these missing data using linear interpolation. I imputed the remaining missing data using multiple imputation with 15 replications. 25. The closeness centrality of a civil society organization is defined by the inverse of the average length of the shortest paths to or from all other civil society organizations in the network. Hence, well-networked organizations have high closeness centrality scores. Separate analyses using betweenness centrality or the raw number of network ties of a civil society organization produce very similar results. 26. For organizations that did not file this form I used their annual reports or websites to establish whether their principal goal was to shape media discourse about Islam. 27. Half of the empirical chapters in Goodwin and colleagues' (2001) volume and four out of six articles in Aminzade and McAdam's (2001) edited volume on emotions and collective behavior rely exclusively on textual data. 28. For example, the term "hate" has very different meanings in the following two phrases: "I'd hate to be a president" and "I hate the president." 29. I extracted data on the top-10 searches for each week from the Google Zeitgeist archive (http:// www.google.com/intl/en/press/zeitgeist/archives. html). 30. In separate analyses (not shown) I dropped the news cycle variable and included dummy variables for six of the seven years analyzed. These models produced nearly identical results. 31. For example, Amenta and colleagues (2009) report that the Ku Klux Klan was among the most heavily covered social movement organizations by the New York Times and the Washington Post during the twentieth century. Yet such coverage was presumably very negative, particularly in light of these sources' well-documented liberal bias Ortiz et al. 2005) . 32. Unfortunately, sample size limitations prevent me from running separate models for each time period to further evaluate the process model. Instead, I present two tables in the online supplement that include three-way interactions between period dummy variables, fringe media frames, and displays of anger, as well as period dummy variables, fringe media frames, and inter-organizational networks. Results of these analyses mirror the findings of the field graphs. Fringe media frames and displays of negative emotion have significant interactions within the first period that become negative in the second and third periods. Fringe media frames and inter-organizational networks have a strong interaction in the second but not the first or third periods. The interaction is not significant in the final period analyzed because by this time, well-networked fringe organizations have become part of the mainstream.
33. Field graphs were created using a combination of the Gephi network visualization software and Stata's MDS routine. For another application of multi-dimensional scaling for mapping organizational fields, see Mohr and Guerra-Pearson (2010 
